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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we analyze the performance of an agent developed ac-
cording to a well-accepted appraisal theory of human emotion with
respect to how it modulates play in the context of a social dilemma.
We ask if the agent will be capable of generating interactions that
are considered to be more human than machine-like. We conduct
an experiment with 117 participants and show how participants
rate our agent on dimensions of human-uniqueness (which sepa-
rates humans from animals) and human-nature (which separates
humans from machines). We show that our appraisal theoretic
agent is perceived to be more human-like than baseline models, by
signicantly improving both human-nature and human-uniqueness
aspects of the intelligent agent. We also show that perception of
humanness positively aects enjoyment and cooperation in the
social dilemma.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we investigate a theory of emotion as the method
for generating articially intelligent agents that seem more human-
like. We argue that much Articial Intelligence (AI) research has
focused on building intelligence based on individual aributes that
non-human animals do not possess, but that machines inherently
do possess.
However, human intelligence also requires emotional aributes
and social support, aributes that machines do not possess, whereas
non-human animals do.
e concept of “human-ness” has seen much debate in social
psychology, particularly in relation to work on stereotypes and de-
humanization or infra-humanisation [9]. Since Mori wrote about
the “uncanny valley” [31], articial intelligence researchers (particu-
larly in the elds of aective computing and human-computer/robot
interaction) have shown an interest in this issue. In a comprehen-
sive series of experiments, Haslam et al. [17] examined how people
judge others as human or non-human (dehumanized). In their
model, humanness is broken down into two factors. First, Human
Uniqueness (HU) distinguishes humans from animals (but not nec-
essarily from machines). Second, Human Nature (HN) distinguishes
humans from machines (but not necessarily from animals). Hu-
man uniqueness traits are civility, renement, moral sensibility,
rationality and maturity, as opposed to lack of culture, coarseness,
amorality, irrationality and childlikeness. Human nature traits are
emotionality, warmth, openness, agency (individuality), and depth,
as opposed to inertness, coldness, rigidity, passivity and super-
ciality. us, while one can imagine both humans and machines
having human uniqueness traits, animals would not tend to have
these (they are coarse, amoral, etc). Similarly, while one can imag-
ine both humans and animals having human nature traits, machines
would not tend to have these (they are inert, cold, rigid, etc). While
much research in AI is trying to build machines with HU traits (thus
separating AI from animals), there is much less work on trying to
build machines with HN traits (thus separating AI from machines).
While both problems present challenges, the former problem is
already “solved” to a certain degree by simply having a machine
in the rst place, as humans and machines are on the same side
of the human uniqueness divide anyway. e laer problem is
more challenging as the human nature dimension is exactly the
dimension on which machines dier most from humans.
Several studies have veried that humanness and emotions of
virtual agents can aect people’s behaviour and strategies [3, 6]. For
example, Chowanda et al. [3] captured players’ emotions through
their facial expressions and showed that Non-Player Characters
that have personalities and are capable of perceiving emotions can
enhance players’ experience in the game. Further, Nonverbal be-
haviour such as body gesture and gaze direction aects perception
of cooperativeness of an agent [43].
In this paper, we use an appraisal-based emotional model in the
same spirit as EMA [16], where emotional displays are made using
the Ortony, Clore and Collins (OCC) model [33], and a set of coping
rules are implemented to map the game history augmented with
emotional appraisals to actions for the virtual agent. We refer to
the agent based on this model as the OCC agent.
e OCC agent uses emotions to generate expectations about
future actions [13, 49]. at is, it sees emotions as being related
to an agent’s assessments of what is going to happen next, both
within and without the agent’s control. e OCC agent computes
expectations with respect to the denotative meaning (or causal
interpretation [16]) of the situation, and these expectations are
mapped to emotion labels. e generated emotions are then used
with a set of coping rules to adjust future actions.
We present results from a study involving N = 117 participants
who played a simple social dilemma game with a virtual agent
named “Aria”. e game was a variation of Prisoner’s Dilemma
(PD), in which each player could either give two coins or take one
coin from a common pile. Players could maximize their returns by
defecting while their partner cooperated, and although the Nash
equilibrium is mutual defection, the players can jointly maximize
their scores through mutual cooperation. e participants were
awarded a bonus according only to their total score in the game,
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and so had incentive to cooperate as much as possible. Partici-
pants played a series of 25 games in a row, and then answered a
questionnaire on how they felt about Aria on dimensions of human-
uniqueness and human-nature taken from [17]. e participants
were evenly split into three conditions that diered only in the
emotional displays. e virtual human, Aria, displayed facial ex-
pressions and uered canned sentences that were consistent with
the game context and the emotional state given the condition. One
condition was based on the OCC model, while two were baselines,
one with randomly selected emotions, and one with no emotions.
Our hypothesis was that the OCC agents would show more human-
nature traits than the baselines.
e primary contribution of this paper is to evaluate how ap-
praised emotions relate to two important dimensions of humanness,
and to investigate the impact of appropriate emotion modeling on
perceived humanness of a virtual agent and users’ cooperation. Sec-
ondary contributions are a complete description of the prisoner’s
dilemma in terms of OCC emotions and a demonstration in a simple
environment.
2 RELATEDWORK
Aective computing (AC) has formed as a sub-discipline of arti-
cial intelligence seeking to understand how human emotions can
be computationally modeled and implemented in virtual agents.
While much current work is focused on social signal processing,
the emphasis is on the detection, modeling and generation of sig-
nals relating to social interactions without considering the control
mechanisms underlying the function of emotion [45]. In a broad
survey [38], Reisenzein et al. dene emotional functions as being
informational, aentional, and motivational, but point to a lack of
explicit mechanisms for computational implementation.
Much of the work in AC on the function of emotions has fo-
cused on appraisal theories of emotion, as these give clear rules
mapping denotative states to emotions and show a clear path for
implementation. e appraisal model of Ortony, Clore and Collins
(OCC) [33] describes appraisals of the consequences of events and
the actions of agents in relation to self or other, and is perhaps
the most well used in AC. Scherer’s component process model [40]
breaks emotion processes down into ve components of appraisal,
activation, expression, motivation, and feeling.
Emotion is proposed as a facilitator of learning and as a mech-
anism to signal, predict, and select forthcoming action, although
no precise denitions of such a mechanism is proposed. Ortony,
Norman and Revelle [34] describe a general cognitive architec-
ture that incorporates aect at three levels of processing (reactive,
routine and reective) and four domains of processing (aect, moti-
vation, cognition, and behaviour). e reactive level is relegated to
a lower-level (e.g. hardware on a robot) process that encodes motor
programs and sensing mechanisms. ey claim that appraisal and
personality arise primarily at the routine level, but this is somewhat
contradictory since appraisals involve reasoning about long-term
goals (for example), something that is dened as being only at the
reective level in [34].
Eorts at integrating appraisal models in articial agents started
with Ellio’s use of an OCC model augmented with “Love”, “Hate”
and “Jealousy” to make predictions about human’s emotional rat-
ings of semantically ambiguous storylines and to drive a virtual
character [10]. is was followed by the work of Gratch [15, 16],
and OCC models were integrated with probabilistic models for in-
telligent tutoring applications in [4, 39]. A general-purpose game
engine for adding emotions is described in [37].
e role of aect in decision making has long been problematic,
and focus on bounded rationality following Simon’s articulation
of emotions as interrupts to cognitive processing [41] has been
pursued by many authors [1, 23, 28]. Usually, these approaches
take the stance that the agent is still acting on rational and deci-
sion theoretic principles, but has a “modied” utility function [2],
with some tuning parameter that trades o social normative ef-
fects modeled as intrinsic rewards with the usual extrinsic rewards.
e aect-as-cognitive-feedback approach [19] slightly rearranges
things, and proposes that aect serves as a reward signal for the
default cognitive processing mechanisms associated with the situa-
tion. e BayesACT model uses the concepts of identity to frame
action based on aect alone, considering it to be a key component
of the social glue that enables collaboration [18].
Expected and immediate emotions have been related to expected
utility and modify action choices accordingly [14, 25]. Other ap-
proaches have aempted to reverse-engineer emotion through Re-
inforcement Learning (RL) models that interpret the antecedents
of emotion as aspects of the learning and decision-making process,
but relegate the function of emotion to characteristics of the RL
problem [30]. Many of these approaches borrow from behavioral
economics and cognitive science to characterize the consequences
of emotion in decision making and integrate this knowledge as “cop-
ing rules” [16], “aect heuristics” [42], or short-circuit “impulsive
behaviours” [11] to characterize or inuence agents’ behaviour.
Investigations into the role of emotions in modifying behaviours
in a PD have looked at how disappointment and anger can be used
to promote forgiveness and retaliation, respectively [48]. Guilt has
also been examined and human estimates of behaviour conditioned
on facial expressions or wrien descriptions of this emotion have
been shown to align with appraisal theoretic predictions [8]. Hu-
man and bot play has been analyzed using BayesACT [21], who
showed that BayesACT could replicate some aspects of human play
in PD. Poncela et al. [36] demonstrated how humans split into dif-
ferent player types when playing PD, which are loosely dened on
two axes of optimism-pessimism and envy-trust.
Finally, general personalities based on emotional factors of tol-
erance and responsiveness, and the emotion of admiration were
considered in PD-like situations [24].
Work on negotiations is based in similar theoretical ideas [22],
where expressions of anger (or happiness) signal that an agent’s
goals are higher (or lower) than what the agent currently perceives
as the expected outcome.
ese ndings about human-human negotiations are replicated
in a human-agent study, in which verbal and non-verbal displays
of anger and happiness are also compared [7].
Finally, the same ndings were partially replicated in real (un-
scripted) human-human negotiations [44], where it was reported
that negative displays increased individual gain, but led to worse
longer-term outcomes.
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Figure 1: An example of the game setting. e two coin piles
on the le show the number of coins that the participant and
Aria have earned so far in the game. Currently, the player
has chosen to give 2 and look ”happy” for the next round.
Aria’s current emotion is ”sorry”.
3 GAME PLAY
Our prisoner’s dilemma game seing was implemented using Phaser
(open source HTML5 game framework) and is shown in Figure 1.
e female Virtual Human was originally developed for speech and
language therapy [46] and has been also used in assistive technol-
ogy applications [26]. Here, we call her Aria. In the game, Aria, the
virtual opponent, is siing in front of the participants. On the right,
there is a large pile of coins that the players use. On the le there
are two piles of coins, one pile representing the coins that Aria has
received so far and the other showing participants’ coins. In each
round, the players’ decisions are hidden from each other (hidden
behind the red barriers). ey can both choose between giving
the other player two coins, or taking one for themselves. Aer
the participants choose their actions, they will see the emoji list
(and an emotion word describing each emoji) at the boom of the
page. Aer deciding on the action, participants are asked to choose
one emoji based on their emotion. Upon selecting both action and
emotion, the results will be revealed (coins will appear on the table
and will move to the players’ piles) and both players will see the
other player’s emotion. Aria’s emotions are reected through her
facial expressions and uerances, and players’ emotions are shown
via the emoji that they have selected.
3.1 Emotion Dictionary
We use a set of 20 emotions compiled from the OCC model (see
Section 4) and these are mapped to a three dimensional emotion
space with dimensions of Evaluation (E), Potency (P) and Activity
(A) which is sometimes known as the VAD model where the terms
are Valence (E), Activity (A) and Dominance (P) [35].
We use an emotion dictionary consisting of a set of 300 emotion
words rated on E,P and A by 1027 undergraduates at the University
of Indiana in 2002-2004 [12]. We manually nd the same or a
synonymous word in the dictionary for each of the 20 OCC emotion
words. We also select a set of 20 emojis, one per OCC emotion word,
to be used in the game play as described above.
An important emotion in PD is regret. If a player defects, but
regrets, it is quite dierent than when a player defects but shows
no regret. In the following, we dene regret as any of the four
OCC emotions ”remorse”, ”distress”, ”shame” or ”fears-conrmed”.
Only this last term does not have a direct equivalent in the Indiana
dictionary, and for it we nd the term ”heavy hearted” (E -1.03; P:
-0.55; A: -1.15).
3.2 Facial Expressions
Aria’s facial expressions are generated with three controls that
map to specic sets of facial muscles. We refer to this three di-
mensional space of control as the “HSF”space: (1) Happy/Sad, (2)
Surprise/Anger, and (3) Fear/Disgust. A seing of these three con-
trols yields a specic facial expression by virtually moving the ac-
tion units in the face corresponding to that emotion by an amount
proportional to the control. For example, ”happy” is expressed
with AU6 + AU12: cheek raiser and lip corner puller. Although
the virtual human’s face can be controlled by moving individual
muscles, like the inner eyebrow raise, groups of these are highly
correlated and move in recognizable paerns. erefore, these
three dimensions of musculature movement are deemed sucient.
To map from an emotion label from our set of 20, rst the emotion
word is mapped to EPA space using the Indiana dictionary, and then
the distance to each end-point of the HSF space is computed using
the EPA ratings shown below, also from the Indiana dictionary, and
these distances are used to set the HSF controls directly.
Emotion Symbol E,P,A
happy / sad h+ / h− (3.45,2.91,0.24) / (-2.38,-1.34,-1.88)
surprise / anger h+ / h− (1.48,1.32,2.31) / ( -2.03,1.07,1.80)
fear / disgust h+ / h− (-2.41,-0.76,-0.68) / (-2.57,0.27,0.43)
Aria has a normal ”quiescent” state in which she blinks and
slightly moves her head from side to side in a somewhat ran-
dom way. e emotions are applied for 10.5 seconds and the face
smoothly transitions to a weaker representation of the same emo-
tion and the quiescent state.
3.3 Utterances
Aria also uers sentences from 8 predened sets, one for each
combination of agent action, human action, and binary indicator
of valence (E) being positive. Speaking and facial expressions are
possible at the same time. Lip movement during speech is based on
a proprietary algorithm.
An embedding (vector) for each emotion label is computed using
the pretrained Word2Vec model which was trained on part of the
Google News dataset where the model contains 3 million words
and 300-dimensional vectors [29]. Phrases are embedded as fol-
lows. Stop words are removed using the stop word list provided
by the NLTK library for the English language. e embedding of a
phrase is then simply computed by taking the mean of the Google
embeddings of all the words in a phrase. Given an emotion label,
the closest phrase is queried by computing the cosine similarity
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(dot product) of the vector representing the emotion label with all
of the phrase vectors.
4 OCC MODEL OF EMOTION
According to the OCC model [34], emotions arise as a valenced
reaction to the consequences of events, to the actions of agents,
and to the aspects of objects. In our game situation, the aspects of
objects (leading to the emotions of love and hate) do not change and
so may inuence overall mood but will not change substantially
over the course of the interaction. We therefore focus on actions
and events only. Emotions in these categories are caused by the
immediate payos, or by payos looking into the future and past.
Within each category, there are a number of further distinctions,
such as whether focus is on the self or the other, and whether the
event is positive or negative. ere are 20 emotions in the model
aer removing ”love” and ”hate”.
4.1 OCC appraisals in the Prisoner’s dilemma
Table 1 gives the OCC interpretation of emotions in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game. Each row gives the most recent move of both
agent (Aria) and player (human), and the momentary emotions
appraised on the consequences of events and on the actions of agents,
both of which are appraised for both self and other. e prospect-
based consequences of events are evaluated on each subsequent turn,
leading to emotions shown in the last two columns based only on
the player’s previous move. Emotional intensity is not modeled,
but could be added to increase realism.
Let us consider the immediate payos rst. If Aria gets a payo
of 2 or more, she is pleased, leading to joy when considering conse-
quences for self where prospects are irrelevant (the gains directly
lead to joy). Alternatively, for payos less than 2, Aria is distressed
by the loss. When considering her own actions, Aria is approving
(and so feels pride) if she gives, because this seems an appropriate
action in hindsight. However, if Aria takes, she disapproves of
her own action because she has done something wrong, leading to
shame. Unless if the player shows a negative emotion and gives 2,
then Aria will approve of her action, because she predicts that it is
not going well anyway.
When considering the consequences for the player, if he gets
2 or more, then Aria estimates that it is desirable for him. If he
gets 2, then Aria is pleased, and is happy-for him, otherwise she is
displeased (if he gets 3) and feels resentment. If the player gets 0
and shows a negative emotion, Aria is pleased and gloats, but if a
positive emotion is shown, Aria is displeased and feels pity. Simi-
larly, if the player gives then Aria is approving and feels admiration,
unless the player shows a negative emotion, in which case Aria is
ambivalent. Aria is also ambivalent if the player takes but shows
regret, otherwise she disapproves and feels reproachful.
Prospect-based emotions arise because Aria looks into the future
and predicts how things will evolve. If she gets 2 or more, she feels
pleased and hope is elicited because she estimates things will go
well. However, if the player shows a negative emotion and Aria
has taken, then she feels fear because she predicts a reprisal. If
she gets less than 2 she feels fear about the future, however, if the
player shows regret then she feels hopeful. Looking into the past,
if the player’s action changed from the last time, Aria’s hopes and
fears are disconrmed, leading to the prospect-based emotion of
disappointment. If the player’s action does not change, then Aria’s
hopes and fears are conrmed, leading to prospect-based emotions
of satisfaction (multiple give actions) or fears-conrmed (multiple
take actions). At the start of the game (not shown in Table 1), Aria
feels hopeful because she is pleased about the prospect of positive
payos in the game.
4.2 Coping
Once an emotion is appraised, coping is used to gure out what
action to take.
Five coping strategies are taken from [16]: acceptance, seeking
support, restraint, growth, and denial, and these are applied as
shown in Table 2. At the game’s start, Aria’s hope leads to the sup-
port seeking coping mechanism, and thus to an initial cooperative
action.
5 EXPERIMENT
To assess how humanness of the OCC agent is perceived, we ran an
experiment on Mechanical Turk, where the participants played the
Prisoner’s Dilemma against dierent agents with dierent strategies
and emotional displays. We then asked participants to evaluate
each agent on Human Nature and Human Uniqueness traits.
5.1 Methodology
e experiment consisted of two parts: the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game and a questionnaire. Participants played 25 rounds of the
game against an agent, which was randomly assigned based on the
experimental condition. Aerwards, they lled out a questionnaire
assessing how they perceived dierent aspects of humanness of
the agent that they were assigned to. We ensured that the partici-
pants would pay aention and try to maximize their outcome by
providing a bonus according to the points they earned in the game.
e amount of the bonus was signicantly larger than the initial
payment. Further, participants were told that they will play up to 30
rounds because knowing the number of rounds can aect people’s
strategy in the nal rounds.
5.1.1 Experimental Conditions. e experiment had three between-
participant conditions. In all conditions, participants played the
same number of game rounds against an opponent (Aria) and an-
swered the same survey. However, the behavior and emotional
displays of the agent changed depending on the experimental con-
dition. e conditions of the experiment were as follows:
(1) OCC: Agent acts according to Table 2. Emotional displays
are selected randomly from the set dened in Table 1, and
facial expressions and uerances are applied as described
above.
(2) Emotionless: Agent plays tit-for-2-tats (cooperates im-
mediately upon cooperation, but defects only aer two de-
fections), shows no emotional expressions in the face and
says nothing. is agent still shows quiescent behaviours.
(3) Random: Agent plays tit-for-2-tats. Emotional displays
are randomly drawn from the set of 20 emotions, and facial
expressions and uerances are selected on the basis of that.
e Emotionless agent is added to ensure that the participants
are paying aention to the emotions when rating the humanness
of the agents. e Random condition enables us to study whether
4
Table 1: OCC-based emotional appraisals in the PD game. e “consequences” and “actions of agents” correspond to the OCC
decision tree. means “pleased”,Umeans approving. ♥means desirable, andDmeans conrmed. Aria is ambivalent for all
lines not shown. For example, in the case where Aria gives while the player takes but shows regret, Aria does not disapprove
of the player’s action anymore (because he is showing regret), but does not actually approve of it either, so sits on the fence
and does not feel admiration or reproach.
GAME PLAY VALENCED APPRAISALS APPRAISED EMOTIONS
Consequences
other self Actions
Previous Most Recent prospects relevant? of agents
Move Emotion ♥ yes no Momentary Prospect-Based
for ? self other
Player Aria Player Player ? other? future present D ? U? U? Single Compound Single
give 2 give 2 give 2 any yes yes happy-for
yes hope
yes yes satisfaction
yes yes joy,pride gratication
yes yes joy,admiration gratitude
take 1 give 2 give 2 any yes yes happy-for
yes hope
yes no relief
yes yes joy,pride gratication
yes yes joy,admiration gratitude
give 2 take 1 give 2 positive no no pity
yes hope
yes yes satisfaction
yes yes joy,admiration gratitude
no shame
take 1 take 1 give 2 positive no no pity
yes hope
yes yes relief
yes yes joy,admiration gratitude
no shame
give 2 take 1 give 2 negative yes no gloating
no fear
yes yes satisfaction
yes yes pride, joy gratication
take 1 take 1 give 2 negative yes no gloating
no fear
yes no relief
yes yes pride,joy gratication
give 2 give 2 take 1 no regret no yes resentment
no fear
no no disappointment
no no distress,reproach anger
yes pride
take 1 give 2 take 1 no regret no yes resentment
yes fear
no yes fears-conrmed
no no distress,reproach anger
yes pride
give 2 give 2 take 1 regret no yes resentment
yes hope
no no disappointment
no distress
yes pride
take 1 give 2 take 1 regret no yes resentment
yes hope
no yes fears-conrmed
no distress
yes pride
take 1 take 1 take 1 any no no pity
no fear
no yes fears-conrmed
no no distress,shame remorse
no no distress,reproach anger
give 2 take 1 take 1 any no no pity
no fear
no no disappointment
no no distress,shame remorse
no no distress,reproach anger
the participants pay aention to the dierences in the emotional
displays, and the relationship between their actions/emotions and
the agent’s emotions, when rating the humanness of the agents.
5.1.2 estionnaire. We use four sets of questions before and
aer the game. ese questions are as follows:
(1) Demographicestionnaire: Before the game, partici-
pants were asked to provide their demographic information
(i.e, age and gender). We use this information to control
for possible eects of gender and age on perception of the
humanness of the agents. Participants could decide not to
disclose this information.
(2) Humannessestionnaire: Aer the game, we used the
humanness assessing questionnaire to assess participants’
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Table 2: Coping strategies for the PD bot, including last player emotion, and the last two player moves.
Player moves Player coping next
t-2 t-1 emotion (t-1) strategy example move
take 1 take 1 - acceptance: live with bad outcome “oh well, we’re doomed” take 1
take 1 give 2 positive growth: positive reinterpretation “this might be turning around” give 2
take 1 give 2 negative growth+denial: positive reinterpretation “maybe he didn’t mean that emotion” give 2
give 2 take 1 regret restraint: hold back negative, keep trying “he’s a good person really” give 2
give 2 take 1 not regret denial: deny reality, continue to believe “maybe its not so bad” give 2
give 2 give 2 - seek support: understanding and sympathy “Let’s cooperate together on this” give 2
perception of agents’ emotions and behaviors. e hu-
manness questionnaire consisted of 18 questions. e rst
two questions asked participants to rate to what extend
they thought that the agent behaved human-like/animal-
like. and to what extend they thought it behaved human-
like/machine-like. e following 16 questions used the
traits proposed by Haslam et al. [17] and assessed dier-
ent Human Nature and Human Uniqueness traits in more
details.
(3) Enjoyment estion: Aer the Humanness estion-
naire, participants were asked to rate how much they en-
joyed playing the game. We used this question to study
whether dierent emotional displays can aect partici-
pants’ satisfaction.
(4) IDAQ estionnaire: Aer answering all other ques-
tions, participants answered the IDAQ questionnaire pro-
posed by Waytz et al. [47]. e results from this question-
naire was used to account for individual dierences in the
general tendency to anthropomorphize.
A continuous slider was used in all questions, except IDAQ,
which uses an 11-scale, the standard scale for this questionnaire [47].
In addition to these questions, a total of six sanity-check questions
with clear answers (e.g., “How many ’a’s are in the word “Aria”’?”)
were randomly placed among the questions in the Humanness and
IDAQ questionnaires to ensure that the participants paid aention.
5.1.3 Procedure. Participants rst signed the consent form and
provided their demographic information. en they played 25
rounds of the game against one of the agents, which was randomly
assigned to them. Aer completing all 25 rounds of the game, par-
ticipants answered the aforementioned set of questions regarding
humanness natures, enjoyment, and IDAQ. Repeated participation
was not allowed. We ensured that the participants saw and heard
Aria, and used a browser that was compatible with our platform.
5.1.4 Participants. Participants were recruited on Amazon Me-
chanical Turk. 124 participants completed the game and the ques-
tionnaire (74 male, 48 female, 1 other, and 1 did not wish to share,
age: [21,74]). e data from 6 participants (4 male and 2 female)
were removed as they failed to pass the aention checks. Data from
1 participant (male) was removed as he was not able to hear the
agent properly. Participants received an initial payment of $0.7
and a bonus according to their performance in the game ($0.05 for
each point they earned). Participation was limited to residents of
North America, who had completed at least 50 HITs and had a prior
MTurk approval rate of 96%. e experiment was approved by the
University of Waterloo’s Research Ethics Board.
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Figure 2: Rating of humanness for all conditions. X
axis shows the rating of Human Nature traits (emotional-
ity, warmth, openness, individuality, and depth) and Y axis
shows the rating of Human Uniqueness traits (civility, re-
nement, maturity, rationality, and moral sensibility). 95%
condence intervals are demonstrated.
6 RESULTS
In this section, we will rst demonstrate how playing against dif-
ferent agents aected perception of humanness. We then show the
eects on the cooperation rate and on participants’ enjoyment.
6.1 Humanness
We assessed all the agents based on the rating of HN and HU traits.
Figure 2 shows the results. As hypothesized, the OCC model was
perceived to be more human-like on both HN and HU aspects. We
t two linear mixed eect models predicting HN and HU ratings
based on experimental condition. IDAQ, the general tendency to
anthropomorphize, was controlled for. We also controled for possi-
ble eects of age, gender, and bonus (as the nal bonus may aect
people’s perception of the agent). A random eect based on the day
on which the experiment was run is ed. e modeling results for
HN and HU ratings are shown in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. e
OCC agent’s HN traits were perceived to be signicantly higher
than the Emotionless agent, and its HU traits were perceived to be
signicantly higher than the Random agent. at is to say, overall,
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Table 3: Linear mixed-eects model predicting the ratings
for Human Nature traits based on condition. Age, gender,
and anthropomorphism tendency (acquired using IDAQ) are
controlled for. A random eect is t based on the day.
Covariate Estimate SE t Pr (> |t |)
Intercept 0.268 1.931 0.139 0.890
Random -0.434 0.335 -1.296 0.198
Emotionless -0.786 0.343 -2.296 < 0.05
IDAQ 0.011 0.008 1.432 0.155
genderFemale -2.870 1.585 -1.810 0.073
genderMale -2.868 1.563 -1.835 0.069
genderOther -2.527 2.112 -1.197 0.234
age 0.046 0.012 3.813 < 0.0005
bonus 0.245 0.459 0.533 0.595
Table 4: Linear mixed-eects model predicting the ratings
for Human Uniqueness traits based on condition. Age, gen-
der, and anthropomorphism tendency are controlled for. A
random eect is t based on the day.
Covariate Estimate SE t Pr (> |t |)
Intercept 10.449 3.708 2.818 0.006
Random -2.285 0.644 -3.551 < 0.001
Emotionless -0.495 0.658 -0.752 0.454
IDAQ -0.003 0.015 -0.183 0.855
genderFemale -2.186 3.045 -0.718 0.474
genderMale -2.349 3.002 -0.783 0.436
genderOther -1.269 4.056 -0.313 0.755
age 0.031 0.023 1.333 0.185
bonus -2.821 0.882 -3.199 < 0.005
the OCC was perceived to be signicantly more human-like as
compared to the other two conditions.
Further, the bonus has signicantly aected perception of the
HU traits, as these traits mostly describe perception of the agent’s
actions (e.g., rationality, sensibility). However, we did not see any
eect of bonus on perception of HN traits.
6.2 Cooperation
Next, we asked whether dierent emotional displays aected par-
ticipants’ strategies. All agents played the same strategy (i.e., tit-
for-two-tats); therefore, the dierence in cooperation rates among
conditions can reect the eect of the dierent emotional displays
on participants’ tendency to cooperate (in other words, trusting
the agent). Figure 3 shows the results. OCC has the highest coop-
eration rate and seems to encourage cooperation. is dierence
is signicant between the OCC and Random agent (se = 1.851, t =
−2.006,p < 0.05), however, we did not see a signicant dierence
between the cooperation rates of the OCC and Emotionless agent.
6.3 Enjoyment
We know that perception of humanness of virtual agents can aect
people’s enjoyment in games [3]. Here we ask what aributes of
humans contribute to this eect. erefore, we look into HN and
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Figure 3: Number of rounds in which the participants chose
to cooperate with Aria. e maximum number of rounds
were 25 for all conditions. 95% condence intervals are visu-
alized.
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Figure 4: (a) Enjoyment rating for all conditions. (b) En-
joyment rating based on perception of the HN traits. 95%
condence intervals are visualized.
Table 5: Linear mixed-eects model predicting the enjoy-
ment ratings based on perception of HU and HN traits. An-
thropomorphism tendency, and bonus are controlled for.
Two random eect based on condition and day are tted.
Covariate Estimate SE t Pr (> |t |)
Intercept -1.747 1.308 -1.336 0.184
HN 0.475 0.095 5.005 < 0.0001
HU 0.047 0.051 0.933 0.353
IDAQ 0.020 0.008 2.591 < 0.05
bonus 0.982 0.484 2.029 < 0.05
HU traits independently, hypothesizing that HN traits are the key
factors for enjoyment, as they distinguish humans from machines.
Figure 4(a) shows the enjoyment ratings for each condition. Play-
ing against the OCC agent has improved users’ experience of play-
ing the game. We t a model to look directly at how perception
of HN and HU traits aects users’ enjoyment in the game. Table 5
shows the results. Perception of HU traits does not seem to aect
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users’ enjoyment, however, perception of HN traits signicantly
aected enjoyment in the game. at is, playing against an agent
that is perceived to be more human-like in HN traits (with the exact
same strategy and actions) signicantly increased enjoyment in
the game. ese results are visualized in Figure 4(b). As expected,
the anthropomorphism tendency and the nal bonus both aected
happiness; therefore they are controlled for in the model.
7 DISCUSSION
Virtual agents and assistants are used in many domains to enhance
people’s quality of life. We are especially interested in application
of virtual agents in health care, for assisting people with cognitive
disabilities such as Alzheimer’s Disease in performing daily activi-
ties. Such assistants can decrease the dependence on the caregiver
and reduce their burden. One challenge, however, is that the agent
should be designed in a way that it can be successfully adopted
by older adults with less exposure to technology. We know that
aective experience increases engagement [32] of users, improves
loyalty [20], and inuences perception of humanness of the agents,
which can aect people’s behaviour and enjoyment [3]. erefore,
in this paper, we studied how emotions aect perception of dierent
dimensions of humanness of the agents, and users’ trust.
We utilized Haslam et al.’s denition of humanness [17] to study
how emotions aect perception of Human Nature (HN), distinguish-
ing humans from machines, and Human Uniqueness (HU), distin-
guishing humans from animals. We asked how emotions aect
peoples’ perception of HU and HN traits of an agent, and as a result,
their opinion and behaviour towards the agents. We hypothesized
that although there is an emphasis on improving the HU dimen-
sion of computers (as a result of making computers more rened,
rational, and moral), improving the HN dimension has seen rela-
tively limited aention. With emotionality being an aspect of HN,
we hypothesize that agents capable of showing emotions will be
perceived more human-like, especially on the HN traits.
We used a social dilemma, the prisoner’s dilemma, to test this
hypothesis. In prisoner’s dilemma, the players cooperate if they
trust the opponent, so this game enables us study how emotions
and perception of humanness of agents can aect trust. Although
all the agents (opponents) played the same tit-for-2-tats strategy,
they diered in the emotional displays, which signicantly aected
perception of human-like traits. e OCC agent, capable of showing
meaningful emotions, was perceived signicantly more human-like
on both HN and HU traits. is signicantly improved partici-
pants’ cooperation rate and enjoyment. Any expression of emotion,
even by the random agent, improved perception of Human Nature
traits (warmth, openness, emotionality, individuality, and depth).
However, displaying random emotion negatively aected Human
Uniqueness traits (civility, renement, moral sensibility, rationality
and maturity), as it can make the agent look irrational and immature.
at is to say, while showing proper emotions enables computer
agents with Human Nature traits and lls the gap between humans
and machines, showing random emotions that are not necessarily
meaningful is even worse than showing no emotions for the Human
Uniqueness traits, making the agent more animal-like.
An interesting observation was that the general anthropomor-
phism tendency (measured through the IDAQ questionnaire) sig-
nicantly and negatively aected cooperation. is may suggest
an uncanny valley eect: those who anthropomorphized more
perceived Aria to be more similar to humans, which resulted in
disliking Aria and not trusting her [27].
Finally, age signicantly aected ratings of Human Nature traits.
All the agents were perceived more human-like on the HN traits
when age increased. is may be because the younger adults are
more used to seeing avatars and characters in computer games,
which look similar to humans, thus have a higher standard in mind
regarding virtual agents. Another interesting observation was that
the amount of bonus signicantly aected perception of HU traits.
Possibility because the participants believed that the agent (i.e. their
opponent in the game) was in fact responsible for what they earned
(the results), and associated a higher bonus to a beer performance
of the opponent (despite the fact that the strategy of all the agents
was the same).
Our work has a number of limitations. First, the OCC coping
mechanism is theoretically dicult to justify and is usually specied
in a rather ad-hoc manner [5]. In the simple game considered here,
it provides a reasonable approximation and yields a strategy oen
used by humans (tit-for-two-tat). Similar coping strategies could
be dened using an “intrinsic reward” generated by the appraisal
variables. As reviewed by Broekens et al. [30], this intrinsic reward
requires some weighting factor (e.g. ϕ in [30]) which is dicult
to specify. In this simple game, we could, for example, consider
that motivational relevance, which is inversely proportional to the
distance from the goal, may be larger in cases where the agent
predicts cooperation (e.g., the other player cooperates, or defects
but shows regret), and smaller when the agent predicts defection
(e.g., the other player defects and shows no regret, or defects mul-
tiple times). Motivational relevance would add intrinsic reward
to the cooperation option, making it game theoretically optimal
compared to defection. In the give2-take1 game, this would require
adding a reward of 1 to the cooperation option when motivational
relevance was high (when there was “hope”) and not doing so when
motivational relevance was low (when there was “fear”).
A second limitation is that emotions are displayed in the face
based only on a dimensional emotion model (EPA space), and ne-
glects semantic context. For example, while repentant and reverent
have dierent meanings which should result in dierent facial ex-
pressions, their EPA ratings are almost identical. erefore there
are some instances where mapping from EPA→ facial expressions
does seem accurate, but emotion label→ facial expression not so
much. A third limitation is the limited number of emojis used to
allow human players to express emotions, and the interpretation
given to those emojis by the participants. While the emotion word
can be seen by hovering, a beer method would involve facial
expression recognition to extract emotional signals directly.
8 CONCLUSION
is paper described our work towards understanding the eect
of emotions on dierent dimensions of humanness of computer
agents, as well as on users’ cooperation tendency and enjoyment.
We studied traits distinguishing humans from machines (Human
Nature), and those distinguishing humans from animals (Human
Uniqueness), and showed that proper expressions of emotions in-
creases perception of human nature of agents. While researchers
can successfully improve perception of Human Uniqueness traits
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by making agents smarter, emotions are critical for perception of
Human Nature traits. is improvement also positively aected
users’ cooperation with the agent and their enjoyment. Further,
we showed that if emotions are not reected properly (e.g., gen-
erated randomly), they can have negative eects on perception of
humanness (HU traits) and can reduce the quality of social agents,
even compared to when the agent does not reect any emotions.
erefore, it is important to nd models that accurately understand
and express emotions, and utilize them properly in developing
virtual agents, should those agents need to be perceived as more
human-like.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
is work was supported by Natural Sciences and Engineering
Research Council of Canada (NSERC) and Social Sciences and Hu-
manities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) through the Trans-
Atlantic Platform’s Digging into Data Program. We thank Naawut
Ngampatipatpong and Sarel van Vuuren for help with the virtual
human.
REFERENCES
[1] Dimitrios Antos and Avi Pfeer. 2011. Using Emotions to Enhance Decision-
Making. In Proc. International Joint Conferences on Articial Intelligence.
Barcelona, Spain.
[2] Roland Be´nabou and Jean Tirole. 2006. Incentives and Prosocial Behaviour.
American Economic Review 96 (2006), 1652–1678.
[3] Andry Chowanda, Martin Flintham, Peter Blancheld, and Michel Valstar. 2016.
Playing with social and emotional game companions. In International Conference
on Intelligent Virtual Agents. Springer, 85–95.
[4] Cristina Conati and Heather Maclaren. 2009. Empirically Building and Evaluating
a Probabilistic Model of User Aect. User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction
19 (2009), 267–303.
[5] Carlos Crivelli and Alan J. Fridlund. 2018. Facial Displays are Tools for Social
Inuence. Trends in Cognitive Science (2018).
[6] Celso M De Melo, Peter Carnevale, and Jonathan Gratch. 2010. e inuence
of emotions in embodied agents on human decision-making. In International
Conference on Intelligent Virtual Agents. Springer, 357–370.
[7] Celso M. de Melo, Peter Carnevale, and Jonathan Gratch. 2011. e Eect of
Expression of Anger and Happiness in Computer Agents on Negotiations with
Humans. In Proc. International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems (AAMAS). Taipei, Taiwan.
[8] Celso M. de Melo, Peter Carnevale, Stephen Read, Dimitrios Antos, and Jonathan
Gratch. 2012. Bayesian Model of the Social Eects of Emotion in Decision-
Making in Multiagent Systems. In Proc. International Conference on Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS). Valencia, Spain.
[9] Ste´phanie Demoulin, Jacques-Philippe Leyens, Maria-Paola Paladino, Ramo´n
Rodriguez-Torres, Armando Rodriguez-Perez, and John Dovidio. 2004. Dimen-
sions of ”uniquely” and ”non-uniquely” human emotions. Cognition and emotion
18, 1 (2004), 71–96.
[10] Clark Ellio. 1998. Hunting for the Holy Grail with ’Emotionally Intelligent’
Virtual Actors. ACM SIGART Bulletin 9, 1 (1998), 20–28.
[11] P. Gomez Esteban and D. Rios Insua. 2017. An Aective Model for a non-
Expensive Utility-based Decision Agent. IEEE Transactions on Aective Comput-
ing (2017), 1–1. hps://doi.org/10.1109/TAFFC.2017.2737979
[12] Clare Francis and David R. Heise. 2006. Mean Aective Ratings of 1,500 Concepts
by Indiana University Undergraduates in 2002-3. [Computer le] Distributed at
Aect Control eory Website. (2006).
[13] Nico H. FRidja. 2010. e Psychologists’ Point of View. In Handbook of Emotions
(third edition ed.). e Guildford Press, 68–77.
[14] Moojan Ghafurian and David Reier. 2018. Impatience in Timing Decisions:
Eects and Moderation. Timing & Time Perception 6, 2 (2018), 183–219.
[15] Jonathan Gratch. 2000. Emile: Marshalling Passions in Training and Education. In
Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Autonomous Agents. Barcelona,
Spain.
[16] Jonathan Gratch and Stacy Marsella. 2004. A domain-independent framework
for modeling emotion. Cognitive Systems Research 5, 4 (2004), 269 – 306. hps:
//doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2004.02.002
[17] N. Haslam, S. Loughnan, Y. Kashima, and P. Bain. 2008. Aributing and denying
humanness to others. European Review of Social Psychology 19, 1 (2008), 55–85.
[18] Jesse Hoey, Tobias Schro¨der, and Areej Alhothali. 2016. Aect Control Processes:
Intelligent Aective Interaction using a Partially Observable Markov Decision
Process. Articial Intelligence 230 (January 2016), 134–172.
[19] Jerey R. Huntsinger, Linda M. Isbell, and Gerald L. Clore. 2014. e Aective
Control of ought: Malleable, Not Fixed. Psychological Review 121, 4 (2014),
600–618.
[20] Morgan Jennings. 2000. eory and models for creating engaging and immersive
ecommerce websites. In Proceedings of the 2000 ACM SIGCPR conference on
Computer personnel research. ACM, 77–85.
[21] Joshua D.A. Jung and Jesse Hoey. 2016. Grounding Social Interaction with
Aective Intelligence. In Proceedings of the Canadian Conference on AI. Victoria,
BC.
[22] Gerben A. Van Kleef, C De Dreu, and A. Manstead. 2004. e interpersonal
eects of anger and happiness in negotiations. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology 86 (2004), 57–76.
[23] Christine Laetitia Lisei and Piotr Gmytrasiewicz. 2002. Can a rational
agent aord to be aectless? a formal approach. Applied Articial Intel-
ligence 16, 7-8 (2002), 577–609. hps://doi.org/10.1080/08839510290030408
arXiv:hp://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/08839510290030408
[24] Martyn Lloyd-Kelly, Katie Atkinson, and Trevor Bench-Capon. 2012. Developing
Co-operation rough Simulated Emotional Behaviour. In MABS 2012: 13th
International Workshop on Multi-Agent Based Simulation. Valencia, Spain.
[25] G. Loewenstein and J.S. Lerner. 2003. e Role of Aect in Decision Making. In
Handbook of Aective Sciences, R.J. Davidson, K.R. Sherer, and H.H. Goldsmith
(Eds.). Oxford Univ. Press, 619–642.
[26] Aarti Malhotra, Jesse Hoey, Alexandra Ko¨nig, and Sarel van Vuuren. 2016. A
study of elderly people’s emotional understanding of prompts given by Virtual
Humans. In Proc. International Conference on Pervasive Computing Technologies
for Healthcare. Cancun, Mexico, 13–16.
[27] Maya B Mathur and David B Reichling. 2016. Navigating a social world with
robot partners: A quantitative cartography of the Uncanny Valley. Cognition 146
(2016), 22–32.
[28] Barbara Mellers, Alan Schwartz, and Ilana Ritov. 1999. Emotion-Based Choice.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 128, 3 (1999), 322–345.
[29] T. Mikolov, I. Sutskever, K. Chen, G. Corrado, and J. Dean. 2013. Distributed
Representations of Words and Phrases and their Compositionality. ArXiv e-prints
(Oct. 2013). arXiv:cs.CL/1310.4546
[30] omas M. Moerland, Joost Broekens, and Catholijn M. Jonker. 2017. Emotion
in Reinforcement Learning Agents and Robots: A Survey. Machine Learning 107,
2 (2017), 443–480.
[31] M. Mori. 1970. Bukimi no tani (the uncanny valley). Energy 7, 4 (1970), 3335.
[32] Heather L O’Brien and Elaine G Toms. 2008. What is user engagement? A
conceptual framework for dening user engagement with technology. Journal of
the American society for Information Science and Technology 59, 6 (2008), 938–955.
[33] A. Ortony, G.L. Clore, and A. Collins. 1988. e Cognitive Structure of Emotions.
Cambridge University Press.
[34] A. Ortony, D. Norman, and W. Revelle. 2005. Aect and proto-aect in eective
functioning. In Who needs emotions: e brain meets the machine, J. Fellous and
M. Arbib (Eds.). Oxford University Press, 173–202.
[35] Charles E. Osgood, William H. May, and Murray S. Miron. 1975. Cross-Cultural
Universals of Aective Meaning. University of Illinois Press.
[36] Julia Poncela-Casasnovas, Mario Gutie´rrez-Roig, Carlos Gracia-La´zaro, Julian
Vicens, Jesu´s Go´mez-Gardena, Josep Perello´, Yamir Moreno, Jordi Duch, and
Angel Sa´nchez. 2016. Humans display a reduced set of consistent behavioral
phenotypes in dyadic games. Science Advances 2, 8 (2016).
[37] Alexandru Popescu, Joost Broekens, and Maarten van Someren. 2014. GAMYG-
DALA: an Emotion Engine for Games. IEEE Transactions on Aective Computing
5, 1 (2014), 32–44.
[38] Rainer Reisenzein, Eva Hudlicka, Mehdi Dastani, Jonathan Gratch, Koen Hin-
driks, Emiliano Lorini, and John-Jules Ch Meyer. 2013. Computational modeling
of emotion: Toward improving the inter-and intradisciplinary exchange. IEEE
Transactions on Aective Computing 4, 3 (2013), 246–266.
[39] Jennifer Sabourin, Bradford Mo, and James C. Lester. 2011. Modeling learner
aect with theoretically grounded dynamic Bayesian networks. In Proc. Aective
Computing and Intelligent Interaction. Springer-Verlag, 286–295.
[40] Klaus R. Scherer, A. Schorr, and T. Johnstone. 2001. Appraisal Processes in Emotion.
Oxford University Press.
[41] Herbert A. Simon. 1967. Motivational and Emotional Controls of Cognition.
Psychological Review 74 (1967), 29–39.
[42] Paul Slovic, Melissa Finucane, Ellen Peters, and Donald G. MacGregor. 2007.
e Aect Heuristic. European Journal of Operations Research 177, 3 (2007),
1333–1352.
[43] Carolin Straßmann, Astrid Rosenthal von der Pu¨en, Ramin Yaghoubzadeh,
Raael Kaminski, and Nicole Kra¨mer. 2016. e eect of an intelligent virtual
agent’s nonverbal behavior with regard to dominance and cooperativity. In
International Conference on Intelligent Virtual Agents. Springer, 15–28.
[44] Giota Stratou, Rens Hoegen, Gale Lucas, and Jonathan Gratch. 2015. Emotional
Signaling in a Social Dilemma: an Automatic Analysis. In Humaine Association
9
Conference on Aective Computing and Intelligent Interaction (ACII). Xi’an, China.
[45] Alessandro Vinciarelli, Maja Pantic, Dirk Heylen, Catherine Pelachaud, Isabella
Poggi, Francesca D’Errico, and Marc Schroeder. 2012. Bridging the gap between
social animal and unsocial machine: A survey of social signal processing. IEEE
Transactions on Aective Computing 3, 1 (2012), 69–87.
[46] Sarel Van Vuuren and L.R. Cherney. 2014. A Virtual erapist for Speech and
Language erapy. In Proc. Intelligent Virtual Agents, LNAI 8637. Springer, 438–
448.
[47] Adam Waytz, John Cacioppo, and Nicholas Epley. 2010. Who sees human?
e stability and importance of individual dierences in anthropomorphism.
Perspectives on Psychological Science 5, 3 (2010), 219–232.
[48] Maarten J.J. Wubben, David De Cremer, and Eric van Dijk. 2009. How emotion
communication guides reciprocity: Establishing cooperation through disappoint-
ment and anger. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 45, 4 (2009), 987 – 990.
hps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2009.04.010
[49] R.B. Zajonc. 2000. Feeling and inking: Closing the Debate over the Indepen-
dence of Aect. In Feeling and inking: e Role of Aect in Social Cognition.
Studies in Emotion and Social Interaction, J. P. Forgas (Ed.). Vol. 2. Cambridge
University Press, New York, 31–58.
10
